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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Title VII—Class Actions—Adequacy of Representation—Air Line
Stewards & Stewardesses Association, Local 550, v. American Air-
lines, Inc. 1 —Several individual plaintiffs appeal from a district
court judgment approving settlement of two separate class actions
(American Airlines, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc. being the
respective defendants), ordering it implemented, and dismissing the
action on the merits. 2 A related class action against American Air-
lines and Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association (ALSSA)
was also dismissed, and those plaintiffs appeal. 3
In June 1970, ALSSA filed charges with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the defendant air-
lines, alleging that the airlines' policy of terminating the employ-
ment of stewardesses who became pregnant violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4
 Thirty days later EEOC notified the
union that it was entitled to commence a civil action under § 706(d)
of the Act; 5
 later ALSSA and several individuals filed class actions
against the airlines. The complaints asserted that the actions were
class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 6
 and that the class consisted of all present and former
stewardesses employed by the airlines at any time since July 2,
1965 7 who had been, 8 desired to be, or would desire in the future to
be, pregnant. The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and
monetary relief.
By October, 1970, collective bargaining agreements between
ALSSA and the airlines provided for prospective elimination of
the challenged practice, 9 leaving reinstatement of discharged
stewardesses with accrual of seniority and back pay, if any, the only
issues remaining to be litigated. In July 1971, a year after the
actions had been filed, ALSSA and the airlines reached agreement
on a settlement, subject to court approval."
490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 42 U.S.L.W. 3628 (U.S. May
13, 1974).
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
• 490 F.2d at 637.
4
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e at seq. (1970).
5 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-5(d) (1970).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole . . .
For the prerequisites to a class action contained in Subdivision (a) of Rule 23, see note 12
infra.
• July 2, 1965 was the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 266 (1964).
8 See note 47 infra for a discussion of the time requirements for filing a complaint under
Title VII.
• 490 F.2d at 638.
I° See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), quoted in note 2 supra.
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The airlines and the union proposed that discharged steward-
esses who desired reemployment be required to notify the airlines of
that desire within sixty days of court approval of the settlement.
The stewardesses would not be reinstated immediately, but instead
would be placed on a preferential hiring list to fill vacancies ahead
of new applicants. When offered a job, a stewardess would be
required to accept it within ten days; actual reinstatement was
conditioned on her meeting weight restrictions and other physical
qualifications in effect at the time of her discharge. Upon reinstate-
ment a stewardess who had been employed by American Airlines
would have the same seniority she had on the day of her discharge;
for a former TWA stewardess, seniority would be the same as she
had on the day of her discharge plus ninety days. The airlines would
not be liable to a discharged stewardess who failed to give timely
notice of a desire to be reemployed or to accept an offer of reem-
ployment. There were no provisions made for back pay. The settle-
ment offered a redefinition of the class as all those whose employ-
ment was terminated because of pregnancy between the effective
date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and July 31, 1969, in the case of
TWA, and August 11, 1970, in the case of American Airlines."
On July 16, 1971 the district court made its first ruling concern-
ing the maintenance of the actions as class actions. The court did
not specifically address the prerequisites to a class action set out in
Rule 23(a), 12
 nor did it address itself to any of the additional
requirements of Rule 23(b). Nevertheless, it ordered that both ac-
tions be maintained as Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, with the result
that the class in each action was defined in accordance with the
proposed settlement." Notice of a hearing on the proposed settle-
ment was sent out, but the hearing was delayed while an appeal was
taken on an issue not here relevant. 14
 A second notice was sent out
in February 1972 for a hearing in March.
" 490 F.2d at 638.
12
 Fed. It. Civ. P. 23(a) stipulates:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
' 3
 Brief for Appellants at 7, Airline Stewards '& Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v.
American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appel-
lants].
14
 The hearing was delayed by the EEOC's appeal of a district court order denying the
Commission the right to intervene in the class actions pursuant to Fed, R. Civ. P. 24(a). The
Commission, noting that the proposed settlement did not entitle the discharged stewardesses
to immediate unconditional reinstatement, full seniority from time of first hire and back pay
from the date of discharge, asserted that the settlement afforded a narrower brand of relief
than would be awarded upon successful litigation of the claim. Consequently, the Commission
argued, it should be allowed to intervene to protect "the public interest" by making certain the
remedies ultimately agreed on by ALSSA and the airlines vindicated the policies of Title VII,
1327
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Meanwhile, on July 14, 1971, dissatisfaction with the proposed
settlement surfaced when several of the discharged stewardesses in
the American Airlines suit filed their own class action in a federal
district court in California) 5 That action was stayed until the Il-
linois district court hearing the original actions determined whether
the dissident class members were entitled to opt out of the original
suits." On February 28, 1972, several more dissident class members
brought yet another class action in an Illinois district court,' 7 with
American Airlines and ALSSA as defendants. Their complaint al-
leged the same unlawful employment practice charge advanced in
the original actions, and in addition, charged that ALSSA had failed
in its duty of fair representation. On March 17, 1972, judgment was
entered in the original actions which determined then to be (b)(2)
class actions; declared the judgment binding on all members of the
class; and concluded that the settlement was fair and adequate for
all. Three days later the dissident class action brought against
American Airlines and ALSSA was dismissed, apparently on the
ground that the claims had been adjudicated by the judgment of
March 17) 8
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
HELD: (1) the union, whose interests were antagonistic to previous
members who had been discharged because of pregnancy, was not
The court of appeals rejected this and other similar contentions by stating that, as a general
proposition, "the public interest" may be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side
gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation, especially in actions under Title VII, where
there is great emphasis on private settlement and elimination of unfair employment practices
without litigation. Intervention by the EEOC was thus denied. Air Line Stewards & Stewar-
desses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1972).
15 Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 5.
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) allows a member of a class action maintained under
subsection (b)(3) to exclude himself from the suit and thereby avoid binding judgment.
Members of class actions maintained under subsections (b)(I) or (b)(2) do not have this option.
This feature of (b)(3) is the opposite of the device in the old Rule 23 "spurious" class actions,
in which only those parties who actually intervened in the action were bound by the
judgment. The "spurious" class action was not really a class action at all, but merely a device
for permissive joinder. See Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 539, 546 (1969). For the text of old Rule 23, see Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645, 689 (1939).
Since the district court subsequently determined that the action was a (b)(2) class action,
and since Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) makes binding on the entire class a final judgment entered
in a (b)(2) action, the objecting stewardesses' dissident actions would have been barred by res
judicata had the court of appeals not reversed, as it did in this instance. There are instances,
though, where such final judgments are subject to collateral attack in a later action. For
example, in Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that, although
the class representative's representation in the prior (b)(2) suit was adequate up to the time
that a three-judge district court entered its final order on remand, the representative's failure
to appeal that order, which denied retroactive relief to all members of the class except the
representative himself, constituted inadequate representation of the class, and the class was
not bound by the judgment and the judgment could not be res judicata as to that class. 474
F.2d at 75.
" Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 6.
13 490 F.2d at 639.
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an adequate representative of the class even though it was a certified
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act;" and (2) the former
members of the union who had been discharged from their jobs
because of pregnancy had the right to exclude themselves from the
class. 20
 The court rejected ALSSA's contention that its status as
certified collective bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act
gave it the power to adjust and accommodate the rights of present
and former stewardesses which sprang from Title VII, subject only
to its obligation of fair representation. 21
 It found that unions play no
special role in the vindication of the policies of Title VII. 22 It also
determined that the class actions were improperly classified as (b)(2)
actions, and should henceforth be treated as (b)(3) actions, thus
giving each stewardess the right to exclude herself or appear
through counse1. 23
 The court remanded the actions originally
brought against the airlines with instructions that ALSSA be re-
placed as the representative party by one or more members of the
class in each action. 24
 The court also reversed and remanded the
action brought against ALSSA and American Airlines, since it had
been dismissed on the theory that the claims therein had been
adjudicated by a judgment now being reversed. 25
This note will examine the so-called "majority rule" principle
which governs a collective bargaining situation and show why its
application to a Title VII claim is inappropriate. It will then analyze
the duty of fair representation which obtains under this principle
and will distinguish it from the standard of fair representation to
which a representative party is held under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, it will discuss the different cir-
cumstances under which a class action may be maintained under
subcategories (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 23.
ALSSA's defense of the settlement it negotiated rests on the
assertion that its
role as an exclusive collective bargaining agent for the
stewardesses employed by these airlines gives it the power
to accommodate and adjust the rights of present and
former stewardesses which spring from Title VII, subject
only to its obligation of fair representation. 26
16
 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1970). Section 151, 152 and 154-63 are made applicable to
carriers by air by 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1970).
20 490 F.2d at 643.
21 Id. at 641.
22 Id. at 642.
23
 Id. at 643. Since individual stewardesses may now opt out of each class, the class
action filed against American Airlines in a California district court by dissident members of
the instant actions, which had been stayed pending the outcome of these cases, may now go
forward.
24 Id.
25
 Id. at 644,
26
 490 F.2d at 640-41.
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If ALSSA's contention is correct, then an out of court settlement of
the instant class actions is to be judged within the context of the
so-called "majority rule" principle. 27 Section 2(4) of the Railway
Labor Act provides that a "majority of any craft or class or em-
ployees shall have the right to determine who shall be the represen-
tative of the craft or class . ."28 for the purposes of collective
bargaining, and the employer is required to bargain exclusively with
the representative so selected. 29 When dealing with matters that are
properly the subject of collective bargaining, such as wages, hours
of employment, and working conditions, 3° the collective bargaining
agent may make contracts which have unfavorable effects on some
of the members of the class represented. This is so because the
agent, as representative of the class and not of any individual, must
weigh and balance the conflicting interests of its various members
and produce a contract that is in the best interests of the bargaining
unit as a whole:" it is thought that the welfare of the individual is
best served by promoting "the welfare of the group." 32
The one restraint on this broad discretionary authority of a
union, as ALSSA pointed out, is the "obligation of fair
representation."" This doctrine was first developed thirty years ago
in a series of cases beginning with Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 34 involving alleged racial discrimination by unions certified as
exclusive bargaining representatives under the Railway Labor Act.
Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory author-
ity to represent all members of a designated unit includes a
statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise
its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct."
The majority rule principle and the concomitant obligation of
fair representation, however, are inapposite in the settlement of
grievances. Section 2(2) of the Railway Labor Act of 1 934 stipulates:
[a]ll disputes between a carrier . . . and [an employee] shall
be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedi-
tion, in conference between representatives designated and
authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier . . .
and by the [employee] thereof interested in the dispute. 36
27 See Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 556, 565-72
(1945). See also text at note 58 infra.
2° 45	 § 152(4) (1970).
29 Id.
3° See 45 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970).
31 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
32 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
33 490 F.2d at 540-41.
34 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 	 ,
35 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
36 45 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
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Thus, in a grievance dispute, the representative is not to be chosen
by a majority of the craft but by the particular employee who is
aggrieved. In examining sections 2(4), 2(5), and 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 37
 which are analogous to sections 2(2), 2(3) and
2(4) of the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 38
 the Fifth Circuit explained:
Taking the ... provisions together, it is plain that collec-
tive bargaining in respect of rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment and other conditions of employment which
will fix for the future the rules of the employment for
everyone in the unit, is distinguished from "grievances,"
which are usually the claims of individuals or small groups
that their rights under the collective bargain have not been
respected. These claims may involve no question of the
meaning and scope of the bargain, but only some question
of fact or conduct peculiar to the employee, not affecting
the [bargaining] unit. 39
Thus, although the machinery for presenting a. grievance may be
worked out through collective bargaining, the interest represented at
the presentation is that of the individual employee, not the collective
bargaining unit. 4°
The nature of a Title VII claim is analogous to a grievance.
"The real party in interest in [Title VII] conciliation endeavors is the
employee alleged to have been discriminatorily treated," 41 and not
the union, Though "[t]here is nothing in [Title VII] which [precludes
a union] from recognizing the injustice done to a substantial minor-
ity of its members and from moving to correct it . . . "4 2 the fact
that a collective bargaining representative is defined in Title VII and
37
 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(4), (5), 159(a) (1970). Section 2(4) of the NLRA states: "The term
'representatives' includes any individual or labor organization." 29 U.S.C. 152(4) (1970).
Section (a) states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, that any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, that the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjust-
ment.
29 U.S.C. 4 159(a) {1970).
3° 45 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3), (4) (1970).
39
 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 72-73, 15 L.R.R.M. 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1945)
(footnote omitted).
4° Id.
41
 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v, American Airlines, Inc., 455
F.2d 101, 106 (7th Cir. 1972).
42
 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
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made a potential defendant in unlawful employment practice cases43
indicates that Congress did not intend to give to unions "the power
to accommodate and adjust the rights ... which spring from Title
VII,"44 as ALSSA contends.
In spite of the fact that the employee is the real party in interest
in both situations, there is an important distinction to be made
between a grievance complaint and a Title VII claim: the former is a
contractual claim, subject to the grievance machinery of a collective
bargain,45 while the latter is a statutory claim completely indepen-
dent of the grievance-arbitration procedures of a collective bargain-
ing contract. Although an employment practice forbidden by Title
VII may be treated as an unfair labor practice" and aired through
contractual procedures, if it is brought to arbitration, and the claim
of discrimination is ultimately rejected by the arbitrator, the
arbitrator's resolution of the contractual right to be free from dis-
crimination is not dispositive of the statutory right to be free from
discrimination. 47
It is clear, then, that a union's status as a certified collective
bargaining agent gives it no special role to play in Title VII dis-
putes. But given ALSSA's position to the contrary during the course
of litigation and negotiations, it is not surprising that the settlement
it reached with the airlines strongly suggests that it is the product of
a collective bargaining process." On the question of back pay,"
ALSSA was fairly confident that, if the claim of discrimination were
43
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1970).
ALSSA's potential status as a defendant in the instant suits is no mere theoretical
possibility. Prior to the institution of the class actions, ALSSA sent letters to the airlines,
which stated that "our most recent legal advice is to the effect that termination for pregnancy
is an unlawful practice regardless of marital status, and leaves both the Company and the
Union open to suit." Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 9. (Emphasis added.)
44 490 F.2d at 640-41.
43
 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). In Republic, the Supreme
Court held that the grievance-arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining agreement
must be exhausted before an employee may file suit to enforce his contractual rights. Id. at
656.
"' Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB (Farmers' Cooperative Compress), 416 F.2d 1126, 70
L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). But see Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202
NLRB No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
47 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., — U.S. —, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1022 (1974).
49
 The prospective termination of the alleged unlawful employment practice, which was
the basis of the original complaint, was in fact obtained under a collective bargaining
agreement. 490 F.2d at 638.
49
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) provides that, if the court finds that the employer
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the court may order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, including reinstatement with full back pay. In Sprogis v. United
Airlines, Inc.. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), a stewardess discharged for violating a company
rule that stewardesses be unmarried established employer's liability under Title VII and was
reinstated with back pay and seniority accruing up to the date of her reinstatement,
Both ALSSA and the airlines stipulated that the back pay claims involved a substantial
sum of money. Although no attempt was made to determine the amounts potentially at issue,
one estimate of the total back pay claims, suggested to the district court, was $10 million.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 16.
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litigated, and the airlines' liability established, several class mem-
bers would be able to establish back pay claims. 50 However,
ALSSA estimated that such litigation would consume five years, and
rather than postpone final relief for everyone for that period of time,
the union decided to subordinate the interests of those with back
pay claims to the interest of those who desired to return to work. 5 '
Another factor influencing the union's decision to settle, rather than
litigate, was its belief that the statute of limitations might success-
fully be urged against 90% of the class, and that variations in the
circumstances of discharge raised additional questions concerning
recovery by individual stewardesses." On the question of seniority,
ALSSA realized that the greater the amount of seniority granted to
reinstated stewardesses, the larger the number of currently em-
ployed junior stewardesses who would be put to disadvantage." It
therefore placed the interests of the currently employed stewardesses
ahead of the interests of the discharged stewardesses and stipulated
that reemployed members of the class would retain the seniority
they had on the day of discharge, rather than have seniority accrue
up to the date of reinstatement.
It is submitted that in reaching this settlement ALSSA was
guided by the majority rule principle and agreed to terms with the
airlines which vindicated the interests of the bargaining unit as a
whole (the "majority" in this case being presently employed stew-
ardesses who presumably controlled the union). Judged against the
statutory duty of fair representation enunciated in Louisville and its
progeny, 54
 under which a union may exercise a broad amount of
discretion, it cannot be said that the choices made by ALSSA were
"arbitrary." But when judged against the standard of representation
set out in Rule 23(a), the context within which the choices were
made, the settlement reached was improper.
Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
3°
 490 F.2d at 640.
3 ' Id. Although the sole relief afforded by the settlement was the possibility of reem-
ployment, ALSSA made no attempt to discover what portion of the classes either desired, or
would be able to qualify for, reemployment. Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 19-20.
32
 490 F.2d at 639-40. At the time these actions were brought, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
(1970) required that a charge of unlawful employment discrimination had to be filed with the
EEOC within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred (210 days
in the case of a complaint initially filed with a state or local enfrocement agency). ALSSA was
uncertain whether stewardesses who had been discharged more than ninety days before
charges were first filed with the EEOC would be able to rely on the later filing by other
members of the class. 490 F.2d at 639. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
changed the time requirement from ninety days to 150 days (300 days in the case of a
complaint initially filed with a state or local enforcement agency). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(Supp. II 1972).
33
 Seniority has an important effect on every aspect of a stewardess's job, including
location of her home base, pay schedules, choice of flight schedules and vacation benefits.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 13, at 64.
34
 See text at notes 34-35 supra.
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representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class. 55
These requirements are "an attempt to deal effectively with multi-
party litigation without sacrifice of the individual's rights of due
process."56
 Specifically, clause (3) indicates the identity of interest
which the representative of the class must share with the absentee
members. It "emphasizes that the representative ought to be
squarely aligned in interest with the represented group. ' 57
This respect for the individual's interest is a far cry from the
immateriality of an individual employee's interest which obtains
under the majority rule principle of collective bargaining, where,
by analogy to the political process, each employee, union
and non-union alike, who falls within the unit over which
the elected representative has jurisdiction, is subject to all
provisions respecting his employment upon which the rep-
resentative and his employer agree. . . . [T]he union and
the employer . bind the employee to each change ef-
fected [through collective bargaining] irrespective of the
employee's intent in the matter. 58
The terms of the agreement negotiated by ALSSA were settled on
"irrespective of the employee's intent in the matter": not once
throughout the entire course of negotiations for settlement did
ALSSA consult with any of the discharged stewardesses it
represented. 59
 Furthermore, the union's interest was not "squarely
aligned" with the interests of the absentee members of the class:
ALSSA admitted that, at least with respect to the issue of seniority,
it chose to protect the antagonistic interests of the currently em-
ployed stewardesses who presumably controlled ALSSA, at the ex-
pense of the class of former stewardesses it represented." Given this
55
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). For the first two prerequisites to a class
action, which are not in issue here, see note 12 supra.
56 Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 527, 528 (1969).
57 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 387 n.120 (1967).
58
 Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 556, 561 (1945)
(emphasis added).
59
 490 F.2d at 638.
6° Id. at 640. In Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 F.E.P. Cases 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a
union and present and former male employees brought a Title VII class action against an
employer, alleging that the company's retirement and pension plans discriminated against
men and in favor of women. The district court ruled that the union must be excluded from the
prosecution of the case since the union, which was composed of both male and female
employees, had a serious potential conflict between its duty to its male employee membership
and its duty to its female Membership. 6 F.E.P. Cases at 1310-11. The union was also
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conflict of interest between the duty it owed members of the union
whom it represented in the class actions and the duty it owed to
members of the union not parties to the litigation, it is manifest that
ALSSA could not "fairly and adequately protect the interests"" of
the former group.
The inimical results of ALSSA's misinterpretation of the stan-
dard of representation it must meet during the course of the litiga-
tion were compounded by the district court's improper classification
of the class actions. The complaints as originally filed asserted that
the suits were (b)(2) class actions; the court acquiesced in this
classification at the hearing on the out-of-court settlement even
though individual members of the class raised objections to it. 62
Subsection (b)(2) of Rule 23 is expressly limited to cases in
which "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole" 63 will be appropriate. A prayer
for monetary relief will not necessarily prevent a suit from proceed-
ing under (b)(2), but when such relief predominates, or is the sole
appropriate relief, the action cannot be maintained under (b)(2). 64
Presently employed stewardesses fit the (b)(2) category. The
employment practice complained of had not affected them, it only
threatened to affect them. Having suffered no harm, they could not
pray for monetary relief; "final injunctive relief" was their sole
appropriate relief. The discharged stewardesses, on the other hand,
had suffered a harm for which they sought damages in the com-
plaint as originally drawn. The appropriate remedy for them was
not prospective termination of the practice, i.e., final injunctive
relief, but rather a declaration that the practice was unlawful. Such
a declaration would serve as a basis for awarding back pay and
causing reinstatement to their former jobs. This type of declaratory
relief does not "correspond" to final injunctive relief and is therefore
not covered by (b)(2).
The appropriate class action category for the discharged
stewardesses is (b)(3). Subsection (b)(3) of Rule 23 provides in part:
disqualified from the class on the ground that, since the challenged pension and retirement
plans were the result of collective bargaining agreements between the union and the company,
there was at least a question whether the union might be directly liable to male employees for
damages suffered as a result of the discriminatory plans. Id. See 7 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1761 at 588-92 (1972). But see Pulp Workers Local
186 v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284, 71 L.R.R.M. 2427, (N.D. Ind,
1969), where it was held that a union which had filed a formal charge of sex discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of only one of its members
was not precluded from maintaining an action on behalf of itself and on behalf of all those
employees who had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and from seeking back pay
and reinstatement relief. 304 F. Supp. at 1293, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2435.
61 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
62 490 12 .2d at 639.
63
 For the full text of Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(b)(2), see note 6 supra.
" Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Incl. & Corn. L. Rev. 539,
543-44 [hereinafter cited as Comment).
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An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addi-
tion . . . (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 65
Subsection (b)(3) is a "broad, catch-all category." 66 Unlike (b)(2),
which is concerned with the type of relief sought, (b)(3) seeks to
promote more practical ends, "to achieve economies of time, effort
and expense and promote uniformity of decision." 67 For an action to
proceed under (b)(3), the court must first make two specific findings:
that common questions of law or fact "predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is
superior" in efficiency to any other form of settlement."
The predominance of a common-question requirement should
be construed in light of the broad scope and purpose of economy of
(b)(3): it does not mean that the common question must be diaposi-
tive of the entire litigation. 69 In American Airlines, though there are
varying questions of law or fact affecting ultimate recovery by
individual members of the class," there is one threshhold question
of law which "predominates": the lawfulness of the airlines' em-
ployment practice. The secondary issues affecting the ability of
65
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(6)(3).
66 Comment, supra note 64, at 555.
67 Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
6° Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(6)(3). The Fedral Rule lists four matters which are pertinent to
these findings:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirabil-
ity or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id.
69 Comment, supra note 64, at 549.
7° In addition to stewardesses who were discharged on grounds of pregnancy, some
members of the class were fired on the ground that they had concealed their pregnancy in
violation of a company rule. Others had voluntarily resigned after becoming pregnant, while
still others resigned but claimed they were coerced. 490 F.2d at 640. ALSSA's concern that
these varying circumstances threatened recovery by individual stewardesses does not appear
to be well-grounded. Voluntary resignation in anitcipation of automatic termination of em-
ployment upon the happening of an event is "voluntary" only in the sense that it is in
compliance with a stated company policy: the only choice involved is the Liming of the
termination of employment, not whether or not it will occur. As for those who were dis-
charged for concealing their pregnant condition, query whether violation of a company rule
for concealment of a physical condition not easily disguised is merely an alternative method of
enforcing the challenged company practice. In any case, equitable considerations should
militate against the harsh result of denying relief in such circumstances, since, if the chal-
lenged practice is found to be unlawful, a stewardess guilty of concealing her pregnancy
would have done so to avoid the consequences of an illegal employment practice.
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specific members of the class to be afforded relief can be handled by
dividing the class into subclasses. 7 ' This procedure will insure that
the common question of the airlines' liability will be settled without
being obscured by questions relating merely to recovery. By going
forward in this manner an unnecessary multiplicity of suits will be
avoided and uniformity of decision will be assured. The economy of
litigation so obtained, and the due process safeguards so established,
indicate that this procedure is "superior" in terms of fairness and
efficiency to other forms of settlement.
CONCLUSION
The statutory authority granted a union to collectively bargain
for its members is different from the authority granted a representa-
tive party by Federal Rule 23. The former properly accords a union
broad powers of discretion, to be exercised within the context of a
contractual relationship between two private groups, while the lat-
ter is subject to stringent standards intended to safeguard the due
process rights of individuals in a judicial proceeding.
Title VII creates a statutory right to be free from discrimination
in employment. It also provides a procedure of individual enforce-
ment of that right which is philosophically at odds with the theory
of collective bargaining that the welfare of the individual is best
served by furthering "the welfare of the group." This statutory
concern for the individual is not diminished when the enforcement
of that right takes the form of a class action. For this reason it is
important that courts carefully scrutinize the role a union seeks to
play in a Title VII class action. If the courts abdicate this responsi-
bility, harm to the policies embodied in Title VII will result from the
potential conflicts of interests between different classes within the
union and a union's tendency to resolve such conflicts on the basis of
what is best for the union as a whole rather than what will insure
the full vindication of the specific individual rights involved.
JOHN P. MESSINA
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) states:
When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (13) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly,
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